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ABSTRACT
Voting is an indispensable feature of American democracy. Voting amplifies the voice of
the electorate. Not voting disempowers individuals and communities. Despite protective
legislation such as the Voting Rights Act of 1965, many Americans experience electoral
difficulties today. Following record-breaking turnout in the 2020 presidential election and under
the guise of election security, some Republican lawmakers have introduced and supported
legislation that restricts the ability of many Americans to vote. Research on communities of
color, low-income communities, and disabled communities demonstrates the inhibitive effect of
these measures. In contrast, conventional wisdom claims that older voters are more likely to vote
than younger voters. One theory to explain this disparity is that older voters face fewer obstacles
to voting. This thesis investigates the validity of that claim by comparing voter turnout, reasons
for not voting, and reported difficulty voting in the 2020 American presidential election. Using
an intersectional approach, this thesis hypothesizes that elderly Americans face additional
challenges voting as the effects of age compound the marginalization of other identities. In a
series of logistic regressions conducted using data from the American National Election Studies
and the Cooperative Election Study in 2020, this thesis finds that elderly voters are more likely
to have participated in the 2020 presidential election. This thesis also finds that young nonvoters
report not voting due to psychological reasons at higher rates than older nonvoters, while older
nonvoters report not voting due to institutional barriers. Finally, this thesis finds that voters who
report poor health report have an increased probability of reporting difficulties voting. Despite
not finding widespread support, this thesis concludes by arguing that the electoral rights of
elderly Americans remain a salient issue for researchers, organizers, and policymakers.
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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION
Existing research suggests that elderly individuals vote more often and vote more
conservatively than younger voters (Wolfinger and Rosenstone 1980, 47; Blais 2000, 52; Schur,
Shields, Kruse and Schriner 2002, 167; Shields 2012; Bentele and O’Brien 2013, 1094; DarrahOkike, Rita and Logan 2020, 13). Leighley and Nagler (2014) find that turnout in the oldest age
group, 76- to 84-year-olds, has been increasing over the past several elections, while the secondoldest age group, 61- to 75-year-olds, has remained consistently high (76). In 2016, the turnout
rate for voters 65 and older was the highest among all voters at 70.9% (File 2017). In 2016 and
2018, older voters made up just over half of the entire electorate, while they were 44% of the
electorate in 2020 (Igielnik, Keeter, and Hartig 2021). In 2020, older voters preferred former
President Trump to President Biden, with a marginal difference for voters under 75 and a clear
preference for those between 75 and 92 (Igielnik, Keeter, and Hartig 2021).
This thesis challenges conventional wisdom by arguing that the assumption that elderly
voter participation is consistently high mischaracterizes the electorate as a single voting bloc.
While they may share similar experiences or face similar challenges based on age, elderly
Americans are a conglomeration of cross-cutting identities who experience life differently due to
differences in identities such as race, socioeconomic status, level of education, and disability. By
viewing older Americans as a diverse community, this research aims to investigate to what
extent seniors’ multitudinous identities influence their political participation. Specifically, this
thesis argues that older voters are less likely to have voted in the 2020 American presidential
election when accounting for other identities.
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Voting is foundational to democracy because it enables citizens to select leaders,
influence policy, and exercise their political desires (Hajnal, Lajevardi, and Nielson 2017, 363).
Individuals and groups absent from political life cannot express their preferences to political
elites. When people are systematically excluded from the electorate, the system fails to reach its
full democratic potential (Schur, Sheilds, Kruse, and Schriner 2002, 168). Therefore, efforts to
control who is eligible to vote stifles the wills of some citizens while magnifying the desires of
others.
Electoral participation matters. The American presidential election in 2000 was
determined by a few hundred Floridian voters when an election recount was triggered (Wang
2012, 75). As a consequence of the increased scrutiny on voters in Florida in 2000, many laws
that determined voter registration and electoral processes became stricter (Daniels 2000, 30).
There are more recent examples of why electoral participation matters. In 2018, a tied Virginia
House of Delegates seat was determined by drawing a candidate’s name from a bowl
(McCammon 2018). In 2020, the failure of any candidate to reach more than 50% of the vote
share triggered a special runoff election for both U.S. Senate seats from Georgia (Phillips 2021).
Ultimately, both Democratic candidates won, which meant the Democrats gained majority in the
U.S. Senate (Phillips 2021). The 2020 presidential election was called for Joseph R. Biden days
after election day due to contentious races with thin margins in states such as Georgia, Arizona,
Nevada, and Pennsylvania (Moore 2020). Increasingly close races and electoral scrutiny
demonstrate the importance of voter turnout.
Beyond the intrinsic value of caring about the elderly population, ensuring that older
Americans have equitable access to voting is a form of insurance. Barring unforeseen tragedy,
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every American will become elderly (and/or experience a form of disability) in their future.
Protecting the rights of today’s elderly population may help protect future rights for everyone.
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CHAPTER TWO: LITERATURE REVIEW
Previous research argues that the decision to vote hinges on a rational-actor model, in
which voting is a marginal action with differing costs for each person (Schur, Sheilds, Kruse, and
Schriner 2002, 168). The more an individual feels their vote matters, the more likely they are to
overcome the cost and cast their ballot (Blais 2000, 81). Many individuals feel that voting is not
only a right, but also a civic duty (Blais 2000, 112-113). This minimizes the costs of voting, as
political participation becomes a moral obligation that must be fulfilled as a member of a
democracy, regardless of cost. Those who feel voting is a duty are also more likely to be regular
voters (Blais 2000, 112). Habitual behavior, such as when individuals vote in repeated elections,
may also contribute to fewer perceived voting costs and increased turnout (Ruxton and Saunders
2016, 2).
Because voting in the American system is voluntary, an individual must analyze the costs
and benefits to determine the extent to which they will participate politically (Ellis 2009, 1032).
Voting incurs costs, from payments made directly to the government for the ability to vote, such
as those associated with obtaining documents in order to receive the correct identification card,
to the lost time and energy spent registering, thinking about the issues, obtaining transportation
and childcare, and the act of voting itself (Ellis 2009, 1032-33). During the COVID-19
pandemic, voters—especially the elderly, who are particularly vulnerable to the virus—also had
to weigh the risks versus the rewards of voting in person and potentially exposing themselves to
illness, voting by mail, or not voting at all (Scheller 2021, 180).
Blais (2000) finds that differences in political environment, such as socioeconomic
development, literacy, compulsory voting, and electoral system all affect voter turnout (43).
Individual influences, such as the financial or temporal cost—or the perceived benefit—one
4

gains from voting helps determine which people participate, while political influences such as
social networks and strategic mobilization efforts help determine when they participate (Schur,
Sheilds, Kruse, and Schriner 2002, 169). Individuals who do not value voting above other
activities will choose not to vote, effectively excluding them from the democratic process (Ellis
2009, 1036). The easier the voting process is, the fewer costs a potential voter is likely to
perceive (Blais 2000, 89). Voter restriction makes the cost of voting steeper, which further
discourages vulnerable individuals from participating politically (Ellis 2009, 1036).
Wolfinger and Rosenstone’s seminal 1980 book Who Votes? found that that, all else
equal, older Americans vote at higher rates than younger Americans (47). They find that turnout
for voters over 60 declines based on differences in education, marital status, and gender
(Wolfinger and Rosenstone 1980, 47). However, their analysis does not include race, which has
been shown to be a highly influential factor in voter turnout because of concerted efforts to
stymie the votes of people of color (Bentele and O’Brien 2013, 1089).
Subsequent research also finds that elderly Americans turn out at higher rates than their
younger counterparts, although factors such as isolation or failing to possess the correct form of
identification mitigate the effect somewhat (Blais 2000, 52; Schur, Sheilds, Kruse, Shriner 2002,
169; Shields 2012; Bentele and O’Brien 2013, 1094; Leighley and Nagler 2014, 32; DarrahOkike, Rita and Logan 2020, 13). Other studies find that lower turnout is concentrated among
seniors with disabilities (Schur, Sheilds, Kruse, and Schriner 2002, 167). Daniels (2020)
discusses specific cases in which elderly Black Americans faced bureaucratic nightmares while
attempting to procure appropriate voter identification cards (71-79; 97-92).
Many scientific studies control for age and report the findings, but they do not elaborate
on its importance. In other words, age is included in the analysis, but its incorporation is not
5

theoretically justified. Sometimes researchers offer theories to explain their results, but they
rarely delve into the effect of age to its fullest extent. This thesis aims to be a further
investigation as it examines the effects of multiple identities on the relationship between age and
voter turnout.
According to the United States Administration on Aging, there were 54.1 million
Americans aged 65 and older in 2019 (“2020 Profile of Older Americans” 2021, 4). Seniors
represent 16% of the total population, or one in every seven Americans (“2020 Profile” 2021, 4).
Between 2009 and 2019, the percentage of older Americans increased by 36% (14.4 million)
compared to an increase of 3% for those under 65 (“2020 Profile” 2021, 4). 41% of Baby
Boomers are now older than 65; as they age, the number of elderly people in America is
expected to increase to 80.8 million by 2040 and 94.7 million by 2060 (“2020 Profile” 2021, 5).
24% of people aged 65 and older identify as racial or ethnic minorities, which is expected to
grow to 40% by 2050 (Belt 2016, 1495; “2020 Profile” 2021, 7).
Disabled people represent one of the largest minority groups in the United States (Schur,
Sheilds, Kruse, and Schriner 2002, 168). It is estimated that, in the next 25 years, one-third of all
voters will need some form of accommodation or assistance with voting (Belt 2016, 1493). In
2012, 30.1% of disabled voters reported difficulty voting at a polling place, compared to 8.4% of
non-disabled voters (Schur, Adya, and Kruse 2013, 2). 20% of the voting-age population has a
disability and 36% of the elderly population is disabled (Belt 2016, 1495). Disabled people face
significant physical, social, and psychological barriers to voting and are up to 20 percentage
points less likely to vote than their non-disabled peers (Schur, Sheilds, Kruse, and Schriner 2002,
167). This lower rate of participation for disabled Americans endangers the community as it

6

means they are not proportionately expressing their needs and desires, which can enable elected
officials to ignore their concerns.
Disability is a multifaceted identity and many formal measures of disability only capture
severe impairments. However, the entire community, including those with less pronounced
disabilities, face difficulty voting. Belt (2016) identifies physical access barriers, including
transportation issues, as well as technological difficulties and uneducated election officials as the
main challenges disabled people face when exercising their right to vote. Challenges of particular
significance to elderly voters are ballot access and interference for those who live in nursing
homes, assisted living facilities, and retirement communities; a lack of appropriate identification;
very long lines at polling locations which they cannot wait in; and issues receiving or casting
absentee ballots (Belt 2016, 1506-1511). Additionally, elderly voters may struggle to use new
electronic voting technology or to fill out a ballet due to visual or dexterity-related disabilities
(Belt 2016, 1512). Beyond the polling center, disabled voters may face physical resource
constraints (time, money, and civic skills), psychological constraints (a lack of political interest
and efficacy), and social constraints (isolation from recruitment tactics) when it comes to voting
(Schur, Sheilds, Kruse, and Schriner 2002, 169). The right to vote for intellectually and
developmentally disabled adults—including those with dementia—may be withdrawn through
guardianship laws that vary state-by-state (Brescia 2010, 946). Many disabled voters must
overcome a litany of physical, psychological, and social challenges in order to fully participate in
elections.
Voting rights are a salient political issue. Across 49 states, more than 425 bills with
provisions that restrict voting access were introduced during the 2021 regular legislative session
(“Voting Rights Roundup” 2021). As of October 4, 2021, 33 of these laws had passed in 19
7

states (“Voting Rights Roundup” 2021). These laws are multidimensional. Among other tactics,
they target early and absentee voting, impose stricter voter ID requirements, and increase
scrutiny on electoral rolls (“Voting Rights Roundup” 2021). While many states also expanded
voting access in the same legislative session, the decentralized nature of the electoral system
means that this progress does little to ameliorate the severity of restrictive legislation in states
where it was already more difficult to vote.
Federal voter protection legislation is currently stalled in Congress (Hulse 2021). In the
Senate, the Freedom to Vote Act aims to protect voting, ensure fair redistricting, and reform
campaign finance (“Voting Rights Roundup” 2021). The John Lewis Voting Rights
Advancement Act, its complement in the House, seeks to prevent discriminatory changes to
voting rules based on race or minority language while also restoring the ability for voters to
legally challenge discriminatory voting laws (“Voting Rights Roundup” 2021). However, due to
opposition from some Republican members of Congress—whether for specific provisions or the
bills in their entirety—this legislation has yet to progress in the legislature (Hulse 2021).
The 2020 general election observed record-breaking voter turnout when 66% of eligible
voters cast ballots, either in person or by mail (Igielnik, Keeter, and Harting 2021). In response,
some Republican lawmakers sought to challenge the results and prevent similar turnout in future
elections by introducing measures that seek to limit voter access (“Voting Rights Roundup”
2021). These measures are justified by some as protecting against election irregularities and
promoting election security, while others argue that these tactics merely serve to limit the
political participation of minority voters (“Voting Rights Roundup” 2021).
The evidence for widespread voter fraud is virtually non-existent (Belt 2016; Hajnal,
Lajevardi, and Nielson 2017; Daniels 2020). Rather, restrictive measures such as strict voter ID
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laws are argued by some critics to be partisan tools designed to marginalize Democratic voters
and “shape the electorate in favor of state Republican legislatures facing competitive elections”
(Barreto et al. 2019, 246). This marginalization disproportionately affects racial and ethnic
minorities and those of lower socioeconomic status (Ellis 2009, 1026; Haygood 2012, 1019;
(Hajnal, Lajevardi, and Nielson 2017, 364; Barreto et al. 2019, 239; Kuk, Hajnal and Lajevardi
2020, 1). This thesis argues that it also negatively affects elderly voters, although they are not the
primary target of such legislation. Therefore, elderly voters become a sort of collateral damage in
the larger voter restriction movement.
Voter restriction (and its more blatant counterpart, voter suppression) has a historical
precedent which extends beyond the founding of the United States and the ratification of the
Constitution (Glenn and Kreider 2020, 9). Throughout American history, suffrage was at times
denied to: those without a certain amount of property or wealth, those who could not pay poll
taxes, those who could not pass literacy or “understanding” tests, those whose grandfathers did
not have the right to vote, those under 21, women, Native Americans, enslaved or free Blacks,
nonnaturalized immigrants, servants, the poor, disabled people, people of mixed-race heritage,
religious minorities such as Catholics and Jews, and felons (Glenn and Kreider 2020). The origin
of many of today’s voter restriction tactics come from efforts to disenfranchise Black voters in
the South during Reconstruction and Jim Crow.
Even after the 1870 passing of the Fifteenth Amendment, which prohibited
disenfranchisement based on “race, color, or previous condition of servitude,” many groups were
still prohibited from voting—especially Southern, Black voters. Through great effort, the Voting
Rights Act (VRA) was signed in 1965. This legislation targets Southern jurisdictions with a
history of discriminating against Black Americans by forcing them to obtain federal permission
9

to change electoral laws (Bullock III, Gaddie, and Wert 2016, 18). The VRA has been renewed
and expanded many times, although recent challenges to the legislation (notably Shelby County
v. Holder in 2013) have stripped it of power (Bullock III, Gaddie, and Wert 2016).
The 1990 Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) protects the rights of disabled people
to participate in and benefit from societal institutions (Schur, Sheilds, Kruse, and Schriner 2002,
168). However, even with legislation protecting the rights of disabled people to vote, the actual
turnout rate remains low. In 1993, the National Voter Registration Act (NVRA) required states to
provide the opportunity to register to vote when individuals apply for and renew motor vehicle
licenses (Hale 2016, 194). The NVRA also required states to provide individuals the opportunity
to register to vote when applying for public services, which sought to increase the reach of this
legislation to disabled voters (Hale 2016, 194). However, implementation varies from state to
state, which minimizes the effectiveness of the act in some situations (Hale 2016, 194).
The 2002 Help America Vote Act (HAVA) mandated that every state create a unified
voter registration list and replace outdated voting technology using federal funding (Glenn and
Kreider 2020, 345). HAVA encouraged states to establish opportunities to vote early, both in
person and by mail, although suppressive measures such as limiting the number of polling
locations to increase lines in Black neighborhoods and purging voter rolls diminished HAVA’s
efficacy (Glenn and Kreider 2020, 108 and 113).
While extant literature finds that older voters turn out at higher rates than younger voters,
most research does not comprehensively analyze the effect of age nor does it consider the
intersections of other identities such as race, socioeconomic status, or disability. In particular, the
relationship between age and disability is understudied, as a higher percentage of the elderly
community experiences some form of disability and the disabled community faces multiple
10

barriers to voting despite protective legislation. Due to this gap in the literature, this thesis seeks
to investigate the true nature of the relationship between age, voter turnout, and other identities.
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CHAPTER THREE: THEORY AND HYPOTHESES
This research argues that voter restriction negatively impacts older voters although they
are not the main targets of such measures. Even if older voters are restricted primarily because of
other marginalized identities, it is expected that the difficulties they face will be exacerbated by
challenges associated with advanced age. Because this argument hinges on the complex
relationship between age and other identities, this thesis builds on existing research while
applying an intersectional framework to ground its analyses.
Credited as coining the term intersectionality, Kimberlé Crenshaw examined the
experiences of Black women in the U.S. that resulted from their race, gender, and class (1989,
141). Intersectional theory has since grown into a social science juggernaut (Jordan-Zachary
2007, 255). Hancock (2007) identifies intersectionality as a “body of normative theory and
empirical research” that can help us better conceptualize research designs and data collection
“through its attentiveness to causal complexity” (251). Intersectionality helps researchers
understand differences between and within groups (Jordan-Zachary 2007, 256).
According to Hancock (2007), intersectional analysis assumes that multiple identities
play a role in studies of complex political problems and processes, as the relationship between
categories is more than the sum of their parts, cannot be analyzed independently, and are the
product of individual and institutional factors (251). Jordan-Zachary (2007) describes
intersectionality as an “analytical tool [that is] valuable in the analyses of differences” (255). The
goal of intersectional research is to critically examine the relationship between many individual
and institutional factors (Hancock 2007, 251). As such, framing this research through an
intersectional lens is appropriate as it investigates the relationship between age, race, political
participation, and other identities.
12

The first hypothesis examines the relationship between voter turnout and age. Although
previous research shows that older voters vote at higher rates than their younger counterparts, it
is anticipated that they will be less likely to vote than their younger counterparts when
accounting for differences in race, health, income, and education. People of color, those in
poorer health, and those with less income and lower levels of education are expected to
experience lower rates of voter turnout overall. These effects will then be amplified for seniors.
The second hypothesis investigates what reasons nonvoters of different ages claim
stopped them from voting in 2020. It is expected that younger individuals are more likely to
report psychological challenges to voting, such as political disinterest and feelings of inefficacy,
as these groups are more likely to feel disempowered politically. Older individuals are expected
to face institutional or health-related barriers to voting, such as failing to possess the correct form
of identification or fearing exposure to the coronavirus.
The third hypothesis investigates the amount of difficulty that voters faced when
attempting to cast their ballot in 2020. It is expected that older voters, disabled voters, and voters
of color are more likely to report high rates of difficulty because they are more likely to feel the
negative effects of any sort of voter restriction, while younger voters are more likely to report no
difficulty because potential barriers incur fewer costs to overcome.
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CHAPTER FOUR: DATA AND METHODOLOGY
Quantitatively measuring differences in voter turnout between groups is challenging
because it attempts to capture the absence of a behavior for nonvoters. Researchers typically
study voting because it is a measurable behavior. An individual might not vote for a multitude of
reasons, which makes their inaction difficult to categorize. Self-reporting biases are a noted
limitation presented by survey data. Clark (2018) challenges the validity of asking respondents
why they did not vote because individual decisions lie at the intersection of many factors that
cannot be collapsed into a singular cause (11). Requesting an explanation for why an individual
did not vote also provides an opportunity for the introduction of post-hoc biases that may neglect
to mention the predominant reason a voter fails to cast their ballot (Clark 2018, 12).
To account for some of these limitations, this study relies on data from two publicly
available election datasets. The American National Election Studies (ANES) time series survey
data from the 2020 election is used to test hypotheses one and three. The Congressional Election
Study (CES) from 2020, which has a much larger sample size than the ANES, is used to test
hypothesis one in depth, as well as hypothesis two. Using two datasets cannot completely
mitigate the challenges of relying on survey data, but they provide a larger sample size with
which to test the hypotheses.
The ANES is a collection of time series data covering public opinion and voting behavior
in U.S. presidential elections since 1948. The most recent version, in 2020, conducted 8,280
interviews before the November general election and followed up with 7,449 post-election reinterviews (American National Election Studies 2021, 1). It contains variables that record voter
turnout and difficulties reported while voting (American National Election Studies 2021, 381391). The 2020 CES includes a sample size of over 60,000 individuals (Ansolabehere, Schaffner,
14

and Luks 2021, 6). The CES contains variables that record voter turnout and self-reported
barriers to casting a ballot (Ansolabehere, Schaffner, and Luks 2021, 82).
The first hypothesis, which posits that older voters will turn out at lower rates than
younger voters when accounting for differences in race, health, education, and income, will be
tested using a series of disaggregated logistic regressions in which the dependent variable, voter
turnout, is categorized as 0 for not voting and 1 for voting. Interaction terms are not used because
of concerns about the conflation of hypothesis testing and testing for intersectionality (Bauer et
al. 2021, 2).
The independent variables of interest in hypothesis one are respondent age, race, selfreported health, highest level of education achieved, and family income. In both the ANES and
CES, age has been divided into seven categories. Race was divided into three dummy variables
for those identifying as white, Black, or Latino. Although other race categories were identified in
the initial datasets, they were not distinguished in this thesis to avoid overcrowding the model.
Health outcomes are recorded in each dataset as a 5-point scale ranging from excellent to poor.
In the ANES, education is recorded on a 5-point scale ranging from less than a high school
education to a graduate degree, while in the CES it is a 6-point scale that includes an associate
degree. In the disaggregated model, education is recoded as 0 for those who have not achieved a
college degree and as 1 for those who have at least one. In the ANES, family income categories
range from less than $9,999 to higher than $250 in 22 consecutive categories, while income
categories range from less than $10,000 to greater than $500,00 across 16 categories in the CES.
A table presents the descriptive statistics for the dependent and independent variables below.
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Table 1: ANES Descriptive Statistics, Dependent and Independent Variables
Variable
Frequency
Mean
Voted in 2020 election
Did not vote
1,039
.861
Voted
6,450
Total
7,489
Age
18 to 24
408
25 to 34
1,228
35 to 44
1,378
45 to 54
1,202
4.213
55 to 64
1,474
65 to 74
1,449
75 and over
793
Total
7,932
Race
White
2,215
.729
Black
726
.089
Latino
762
.093
Total
8,178
Health
Excellent
1,114
Very good
2,720
Good
2,796
2.622
Fair
1,240
Poor
307
Total
8,177
Family income
10th percentile
288
25th percentile
345
50th percentile
195
11.733
75th percentile
355
95th percentile
465
Total
7,980
Level of education
Less than high school
376
High school
1,336
Some college
2,790
3.387
Bachelor’s degree
2,055
Graduate degree
1,592
Total
8,149
Source: American National Election Studies 2020
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SD

Median

Min

Max

.346

1

0

1

1.74

4

1

7

.444
.284
.291

1
0
0

0
0
0

1
1
1

1.018

3

1

5

6.744

12

1

22

1.11

3

1
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Table 2: CES Descriptive Statistics, Dependent and Independent Variables
Variable
Frequency
Voted in 2020 election
Did not vote
2,802
Voted
45,660
Total
48,462
Age
18 to 24
2,462
25 to 34
7,295
35 to 44
8,659
45 to 54
7,996
55 to 64
12,323
65 to 74
8,708
75 and over
4,108
Total
51,551
Race
White
44,128
Black
6,952
Hispanic
5,180
Total
61,000
Health
Excellent
6,562
Very good
20,037
Good
22,201
Fair
9,971
Poor
2,198
Total
60,969
Family income
10th percentile
4,634
25th percentile
5,859
50th percentile
4,890
75th percentile
5,029
95th percentile
2,508
Total
54,906
Level of education
Less than high school
1,983
High school
16,618
Some college
13,330
Associate degree
6,539
Bachelor’s degree
14,152
Graduate degree
8,378
Total
61,000
Source: Congressional Election Study 2020
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Mean

SD

Median

Min

Max

.942

.233

1

0

1

.4.222

1.657

4

1

7

.723
.114
.085

.447
.318
.279

1
0
0

0
0
0

1
1
1

2.692

.986

3

1

5

6.388

3.52

6

1

16

3.646

1.502

3

1
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Control variables include a 7-point scale that measures self-reported political ideology
from very liberal to very conservative (CES) or extremely liberal to extremely conservative
(ANES). The 7-point political party self-identification variable in both datasets begins at Strong
Democrat and ends with Strong Republican. In the disaggregated models, party identification is
split into three control variables: Democrat (strong, not strong, and lean), true independent, and
Republican (strong, not strong, and lean). Marital status is recoded to 0 for people who are not
currently married and 1 for those who are married or in a domestic partnership. Gender is
measured as 0 for men and 1 for women. People with children are categorized as 1, while those
with no children achieve a 0. The ANES contains a variable which asks respondents to rank
whether they view voting as a duty or a choice, which is transformed into a 7-point scale ranging
from very strongly a duty to very strongly a choice. The CES has no analog. Control variables
for each dataset are represented in the table on the following pages.
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Table 3: ANES Descriptive Statistics, Control Variables
Variable
Frequency
Ideology
Extremely liberal
369
Liberal
1,210
Slightly liberal
918
Moderate
1,818
Slightly conservative
821
Conservative
1,492
Extremely conservative
428
Total
7,056
Party identification
Strong Democrat
1,961
Not Strong Democrat
900
Lean Democrat
975
Independent
968
Lean Republican
879
Not Strong Republican
832
Strong Republican
1,730
Total
8,245
Marital status
Not married
3,902
Married
4,322
Total
8,224
Gender
Male
3,763
Female
4,450
Total
8,213
Children
No children
5,623
Has children
2,596
Total
8,219
Voting as a choice or a duty
Very strongly a duty
3,359
Moderately a duty
1,147
Weakly a duty
218
Neither duty nor choice
795
Weakly a choice
327
Moderately a choice
1,049
Very strongly a choice
1,364
Total
8,259
Source: American National Election Studies 2020

19

Mean

SD

Median

Min

Max

4.097

1.669

4

1

7

3.888

2.254

4

1

7

.526

.499

1

0

1

.542

.498

1

0

1

.316

.465

0

0

1

3.265

2.395

2

1

7

Table 4: CES Descriptive Statistics, Control Variables
Variable
Frequency
Ideology
Very liberal
7,833
Liberal
8,523
Somewhat liberal
5,937
Moderate
15,238
Somewhat conservative
5,265
Conservative
7,684
Very conservative
6,554
Total
57,034
Party identification
Strong Democrat
16,012
Not Strong Democrat
6,732
Lean Democrat
6,611
Independent
8,862
Lean Republican
5,192
Not Strong Republican
5,002
Strong Republican
10,220
Total
58,631
Marital status
Not married
28,710
Married
32,259
Total
60,969
Gender
Male
22,129
Female
29,422
Total
51,551
Children
No children
18,529
Has children
32,745
Total
51,274
Source: Congressional Election Study 2020
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Mean

SD

Median

Min

Max

3.892

1.9

4

1

7

3.62

2.21

3

1

7

.529

.499

1

0

1

.571

.495

1

0

1

.639

.48

1

0

1

The second hypothesis, which argues that older individuals will report not voting in 2020
due to institutional or health-related reasons while younger individuals will cite psychological
reasons for not voting, uses a variable from the CES to conduct a chi2 analysis with the age
category variable.
Table 5: CES Descriptive Statistics, Hypothesis Two
Variable
Frequency
Psychological
Forgot
76
Not interested
752
Too busy
202
Disliked candidates
777
Felt lacked knowledge
57
Total
1,864
Institutional
Not registered
Lacked identification
1,314
Not allowed
119
Did not receive absentee
97
ballot
66
Did not know where to vote
157
Total
1,753
Issues on the day of the election
Out of town
131
Lacked transportation
129
Could not wait in long lines
32
Total
292
Health concerns
Sick or disabled
327
Afraid of Covid-19
278
Total
605
Other
Other
382
Don’t know
716
Total
1,098
Source: Congressional Election Study 2020
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Mean

SD

Median

Min

Max

.332

.471

0

0

1

.312

.463

0

0

1

.052

.222

0

0

1

.108

.310

0

0

1

.196

.397

0

0

1

The third hypothesis investigates the amount of difficulty that voters reported facing
when attempting to cast their ballot in 2020. It relies on a categorical measure of difficulty from
the ANES, which then becomes the dependent variable in an ordered logistic regression using
the independent and control variables from hypothesis one. It is expected that older voters, voters
of poor health, and voters of color are more likely to report difficulty than younger voters, voters
in good health, and white voters.
Table 6: ANES Descriptive Statistics, Hypothesis Three
Variable
Frequency
Mean
Reported difficulty voting
Not difficult at all
5,671
A little difficult
449
Moderately difficult
179
1.181
Very difficult
56
Extremely difficult
46
Total
6,401
Source: American National Election Studies 2020
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SD

Median

Min

Max

.586

1

1

5

CHAPTER FIVE: RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
The first hypothesis investigates the relationship between voter turnout and demographic
variables such as age, race, health, family income, and level of education. It argues that older
voters will be less likely to vote than younger voters when accounting for these differences.
Table 7 displays the results for logistic regressions conducted using ANES and CES 2020 data.
Table 7: Hypothesis One, ANES and CES
Variable
Age

b (se)

Model 1: ANES
z

margins

b (se)

Model 2: CES
z

margins

25-34
35-44
45-54
55-64
65-74
75+

-.428 (.245)
-.055 (.251)
-.057 (.261)
.471 (.287)
.579 (.318)
1.37 (.359)***

-1.75
-0.22
-0.22
1.64
1.82
3.82

.7864
.8425
.8423
.9005
.9097
.957

.169 (.184)
.827 (.192)***
1.353 (.213)***
1.432 (.209)***
2.317 (.24)***
2.536 (.307)***

0.92
4.31
6.37
6.84
9.66
8.25

.9305
.9628
.9777
.9793
.9914
.993

Black
Latino

-.232 (.227)
-.592 (.181)**
-.13 (.064)*
.064 (.011)***
.311 (.064)***
.086 (.052)
-.083 (.04)*
.25 (.145)
.25 (.123)*
-.186 (.145)
-.258 (.023)***
.92 (.411)*

-1.02
-3.28
-2.04
5.57
4.83
1.66
-2.10
1.72
2.08
-1.28
-11.11
2.24

.8416
.7953

-2.59
-3.19
-3.28
8.11
8.58
-0.90
-1.38
2.47
-1.35
-3.10

.9765
.9662

.8802
.8818
.8536

-.375 (.144)*
-.494 (.155)**
-.156 (.047)**
.146 (.018)***
.308 (.036)***
-.036 (.040)
-.047 (.034)
.271 (.11)*
-.133 (.098)
-.385 (.124)**

.8678

1.297 (.27)***

4.81

.9755

Race

Health
Income
Education
Ideology
Party identification
Marital status
Gender
Children
Voting as a choice
Constant

.9782
.9739
.9717

n
5,910
33,760
Wald chi2
357.76
536.76
Prob > chi2
0.0000
0.0000
Pseudo R2
0.1850
0.1399
*p < 0.05 **p < 0.01 ***p < 0.001
Source: American National Election Studies 2020 and Congressional Election Study 2020
Post-election weight variable applied

The relationship between voter turnout and advanced age is positive, although the overall
fit of each model is indicated through a high Wald chi2 and corresponding p value of less than
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0.001. The ANES 2020 data finds a pseudo R2 of 0.1850, which corroborates this goodness of fit
although it is not directly interpretable. The pseudo R2 is lower in the CES model, although at
0.1399 it also indicates a good fit.
In the ANES model, only the oldest age category is statistically significant. For
respondents ages 75 and above, there is a .957 increase in the probability of turning out to vote in
2020, all else equal, with a p value of less than 0.001 for statistical significance. Although the
relationship between the age cohorts younger than 54 and voter turnout is negative, these
findings fail to reach the threshold for statistical significance. Similarly, although two age groups
of 55- to 64-year-olds and 65- to 74-year-olds find a positive relationship with voter turnout, they
fail to reach statistical significance.
The relationship between identifying as Latino and voter turnout is negative and
statistically significant with a p value of less than 0.01, while the relationship between
identifying as Black and voter turnout is also negative but not statistically significant. This
indicates that identifying as Latino decreases an individual’s probability of having voted in the
2020 election by .7953, all else equal.
There is a negative and statistically significant relationship between voter turnout and
poor health, which indicates that those who experience poor health have a decreased probability
of voting in the 2020 election.
The relationship between income and voter turnout is positive and highly statistically
significant with a p value of less than 0.001, which indicates that those with higher income have
a higher probability of turning out to vote in 2020. Likewise, those with higher levels of
education have a higher probability of turning out to vote in 2020, a finding which is also
statistically significant at a p value of less than 0.001.
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The relationship between conservative self-identification and voter turnout is positive but
not statistically significant, while the relationship between Republican self-identification is
negative and statistically significant with a p value of less than 0.05. This indicates that the more
strongly one identifies as a Republican, the less likely they are to have voted in the 2020
election, all else equal. The discrepancy between ideology and party identification may be due to
differences in how respondents self-identify, as they are more likely to report being strongly
partisan without identifying as equally polarized ideologically.
Being married and having children do not achieve statistical significance in this model,
while gender does. There is a positive relationship between being female and voter turnout in
2020, which is statistically significant with a p value of less than 0.05. Identifying as a woman
increases an individual’s probability of voting in 2020 by .8818.
The relationship between viewing voting as a choice and voter turnout is negative and
highly statistically significant with a p value of less than 0.001, which indicates that those who
view voting as a choice have a decreased probability of voting in 2020. In the ANES model, the
constant is positive and significant with a p value of less than 0.05.
According to the first CES model, the oldest five age categories are statistically
significant with a p value of less than 0.001 for each. The relationship between advancing age
and probability of voter turnout in 2020 is positive, indicating an increased probability of voting
in 2020 for older individuals. When holding the other variables at their means, there is a .9628
increased probability of voter turnout for 35- to 44-year-olds, a .9777 increased probability of
voter turnout for 45- to 54-year-olds, a .9793 increased probability of voting for 55- to 64-yearolds, a .9914 increased probability of voting for 65- to 74-year-olds, and a .993 increase in
probability of voting for those 75 years of age and over.
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The relationship between identifying as Black and voting in 2020 is negative and
statistically significant with a p value of less than 0.05, indicating that Black individuals have a
.9765 decreased probability of voting in 2020. The relationship between identifying as Latino
and voter turnout in 2020 is also negative and statistically significant with a p value of less than
0.01. This indicates that, individuals who identify as Latino have a .9662 decreased probability
of voting in 2020, all else equal.
There is a negative relationship between poor health and voter turnout in 2020, which is
statistically significant with a p value of less than 0.01. This indicates that individuals who report
experiencing poorer health are less likely to have voted in the 2020 general election. The
relationship between income, education, and voter turnout is positive and statistically significant
with a p value of less than 0.001 in the CES model. Those with higher income, and/or those who
have achieved higher levels of education, have an increased probability of having voted in the
2020 election than their less wealthy or educated counterparts, all else equal.
In the CES model, neither ideology nor party identification achieve statistical
significance at the p value of less than 0.05 threshold. Unlike in the ANES model, the
relationships between voter turnout and both conservative ideology and Republican identification
are negative. However, the lack of statistical significance diminishes the impact of this finding.
The relationship between marital status and voting in the 2020 election is positive and
statistically significant with a p value of less than 0.05 in the CES model. This indicates that
married individuals have a .9782 increased probability of voting in 2020 than their unmarried
counterparts. The relationship between gender and voter turnout in the CES model is negative
and not statistically significant. In contrast, the relationship between having children and voting
in 2020 is negative and statistically significant with a p value of less than 0.01 in the CES model,
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indicating that those who have children have a .9717 decreased probability of turning out to vote
in 2020 than those who do not. In the CES model, the constant is positive and statistically
significant with a p value of less than 0.001.
Twelve disaggregated models were conducted to investigate more nuanced relationships
between voter turnout in 2020 and other identities. First, the results of three models distinguished
by race are discussed, beginning with a white-only version and moving on to Black-only and
Latino-only models. Party identification is discussed next, displaying a model each for
independent, Democrat, and Republican respondents. Following party identification, a model
each for those with college degrees and those without degrees are discussed. Two models, one
for women and one for men, are discussed next, followed by a set of models for those who are
married and those who are not. The results of these models better isolate the effect of various
demographic identities on voter turnout and find support for the first hypothesis.
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Table 8: Hypothesis One, Racial Disaggregation
Variable
Age

b (se)
25-34
35-44
45-54
55-64
65-74
75+

Health
Income
Education
Ideology
Party identification
Marital status
Gender
Children
Constant

Model 3: White Only
z
margins

.173 (.229)
.733 (.232)**
1.291 (.25)***
1.544 (.244)***
2.3 (.273)***
2.392 (.353)***

0.76
3.16
5.17
6.34
8.44
6.79

-.222 (.062)***
.138 (.022)***
.299 (.041)***
.066 (.049)
-.116 (.038)**
.397 (.121)**
-.184 (.106)
-.387 (.133)**
1.444 (.339)***

-3.60
6.19
7.26
1.34
-3.04
3.27
-1.74
-2.92
4.26

b (se)

Model 4: Black Only
z
margins

.9429
.9666
.9806
.9849
.9928
.9935

-.18 (.523)
.794 (.546)
1.026 (.581)
.691 (.617)
1.792 (.709)*
1.713 (.906)

-0.34
1.45
1.77
1.12
2.53
1.89

.8815
.9517
.9613
.9467
.9816
.9801

.9837
.9791
.978
.9809

-.185 (.123)
.099 (.049)*
.28 (.092)**
-.068 (.085)
-.167 (.082)*
.279 (.266)
-.287 (.295)
-.462 (.365)
2.122 (.54)***

-1.50
2.03
3.05
-0.80
-2.05
1.05
-0.97
-1.27
3.93

.9578
.9438
.9401
.95

n
26,397
Wald chi2
423.00
Prob > chi2
0.0000
Pseudo R2
0.1350
*p < 0.05 **p < 0.01 ***p < 0.001
Source: Congressional Election Study 2020
Post-election weight variable applied

3,034
57.97
0.0000
0.1022

When the model is limited to white respondents only, the overall fitness is assured by a
high Wald chi2 statistic of 423.00 and low corresponding p value of less than 0.001. The pseudo
R2, while not directly interpretable, corroborates this finding although it is slightly lower than the
more inclusive model at 0.1350. The relationship between voter turnout and age remains
positive. For respondents ages 35-44, this finding is statistically significant with a p value of less
than 0.01. For the age categories of 45-54, 55-64, 65-74, and 75 and above, the findings are
statistically significant with a p value of less than 0.001. This indicates that older white
individuals maintain a higher probability of having voted in the 2020 election. When all
variables are held at their mean values, there is a .9666 increase in the probability of 35- to 44year-olds voting in 2020, a .9806 increase in the probability of 45- to 54-year-olds voting, a
28

.9849 increase in the probability of 55- to 64-year-olds voting, a .9928 increase in the probability
of 65- to 74-year-olds voting, and a .9935 increase in those over 75 years of age voting in 2020.
This fails to find support for hypothesis one, as it argued that those with advanced age would see
a decrease in the probability of voting.
The relationship between poor self-reported health and voter turnout is negative and
statistically significant with a p value of less than 0.001 for the white-only model, indicating that
white individuals who assess their health poorly have a decreased probability of voting in 2020,
all else equal. Among white individuals, the relationship between income and voter turnout is
positive and statistically significant with a p value of less than 0.001, which indicates that white
individuals with higher income have an increased probability of voting in 2020 compared to their
lower-income counterparts. Likewise, the relationship between higher levels of education and
voter turnout is positive and statistically significant with a p value of less than 0.001, indicating
that better-educated white individuals have an increased probability of turning out to vote in
2020 compared to their less-educated counterparts.
For white individuals, the relationship between identifying as a conservative and turning
out to vote is positive although it is not statistically significant. However, the more strongly a
white individual identifies as Republican, the less likely they are to have voted in the 2020
election, all else equal. This finding is statistically significant with a p value of less than 0.01.
There is a positive and statistically significant relationship between white individuals
being married and the probability of turning out to vote in 2020, in which married, white
individuals have a .9837 increase in the probability of voting. This finding is statistically
significant with a p value of less than 0.01. The relationship between identifying as a white
woman and voting in 2020 is negative, although this finding is not statistically significant.
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However, white individuals with children find a negative and statistically significant relationship
with voter turnout in 2020. White parents have a .978 decreased probability of voting in 2020
with a p value of 0.01 for statistical significance, all things equal. The constant is positive and
statistically significant with a p value of less than 0.001 in the white-only model.
The results for the model limited to Black respondents are less robust than those
previously discussed, perhaps owing to the decrease in sample size at only 3,034 individuals.
The relationship between the Wald chi2 statistic of 57.97 and corresponding low p value of less
than 0.001 indicate that the model is appropriate, and the pseudo R2 corroborates that finding
although it decreases further to .1022.
The only age group in the Black-limited model that achieves statistical significance is
those ages 65 to 74. For this cohort, the relationship between age and voter turnout is positive,
and indicates a .9816 increase in the probability of turning out to vote in 2020. This finding fails
to find support for the first hypothesis, as it argued that the older age cohorts would see a
decrease in voter turnout when accounting for other demographic factors such as race.
The relationship between poor health and voter turnout is negative in the Black-only
model, although this finding is not statistically significant. The relationship between higher
levels of family income and voter turnout are positive and statistically significant with a p value
of less than 0.05 in the Black-only model, indicating that wealthier Black individuals have an
increased probability of voting than their less affluent counterparts. Similarly, the relationship
between higher levels of education and voter turnout is positive and statistically significant with
a p value of less than 0.01, indicating that the more well-educated a Black individual is, the
increased probability they have of voting in the 2020 election.
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The relationship increasing conservative ideology and stronger Republican identification
have with voter turnout is negative, although only the findings for party identification are
statistically significant. The stronger a Black individual identifies with the Republican Party, the
less likely they are to have voted in 2020 with a p value of less than 0.05 for statistical
significance.
For Black individuals, the relationship between being married and voting in 2020 is
positive, although this finding is not statistically significant. The relationship between Black
womanhood and voting in 2020 is negative, although this finding is also not statistically
significant. Likewise, the relationship between Black parenthood and voter turnout is negative,
but not statistically significant. In the model limited to only Black respondents, the constant is
positive and statistically significant with a p value of less than 0.001.
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Table 9: Hypothesis One, Racial and Political Disaggregation
Model 5: Latino Only
b (se)
z
margins

Variable
Age
25-34
35-44
45-54
55-64
65-74
75+

.452 (.492)
1.237 (.62)*
1.665 (.693)*
1.624 (.594)**
3.928 (.897)***
(empty)

0.92
2.00
2.40
2.73
4.38

.9118
.9577
.972
.9709
.997

b (se)

Model 6: Independents
z
margins

-.032 (.372)
.468 (.387)
1.111 (.418)**
1.148 (.39)**
1.697 (.496)**
2.752 (.698)***

-0.09
1.21
2.66
2.94
3.42
3.95

.8584
.9091
.9501
.9518
9716
.9899

-.613 (.269)*
-.365 (.357)

-2.28
-1.02

.8937
.912

-.064 (.101)
.116 (.033)***
.424 (.076)***
-.059 (.059)

-0.63
3.55
5.56
-1.01

-.015 (.24)
-.503 (.191)**
-.067 (.263)
.281 (.567)

-0.06
-2.63
-0.25
0.50

Race
Black
Latino
Health
Income
Education
Ideology
Party identification
Marital status
Gender
Children
Constant

.184 (.132)
.303 (.056)***
.438 (.123)***
-.18 (.1)
-.02 (.083)
-.115 (.403)
.017 (.32)
-.446 (.48)
-.894 (.825)

1.40
5.43
3.56
-1.81
-0.25
-0.29
0.05
-0.93
-1.08

.9612
.9635
.9564
.9633

n
2,102
Wald chi2
80.86
Prob > chi2
0.0000
Pseudo R2
0.2081
*p < 0.05 **p < 0.01 ***p < 0.001
Source: Congressional Election Study 2020
Post-election weight variable applied

.9348
.9155
.9336
.9353

3,788
159.91
0.0000
0.1613

Limiting this model to only respondents who identify as Latino further drops the sample
size to 2,102. A high Wald chi2 statistic of 80.86 and a low corresponding p value of less than
0.001 indicates that this model is a good fit, which is supported by the pseudo R2 of 0.2081. The
relationship between increasing age and voter turnout is positive and largely statistically
significant, although there is a limitation in the CES data for Latino respondents who are aged 75
and above. For Latinos ages 35 to 44, there is a .9577 increase in the probability of voting while
holding all other variables at their means. This finding is statistically significant with a p value of
less than 0.05. For Latinos who fall in the 45 to 54 age cohort, there is a .972 increase in the
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probability of voting in 2020, all else equal, which is significant with a p value of less than 0.05.
The 55- to 64-year-old cohort sees a .9709 increase in the probability of voter turnout among
Latinos, all else equal, which is statistically significant with a p value of less than 0.01. Finally,
the 65- to 74-year-old cohort finds a .997 increase in the probability of voting in 2020 among
Latinos, all else equal, which is statistically significant with a p value of less than 0.001. Overall,
this model fails to find support for hypothesis one, as it argued that the intersection of advancing
age and minority identity would result in a decrease in voter turnout.
Among Latinos, the relationship between poorer self-reported health and voting in 2020
is positive, although this finding is not statistically significant. There is a strong positive
relationship between higher income and the probability of voting in 2020, which is statistically
significant with a p value of less than 0.001. Similarly, the relationship between higher levels of
education and turning out to vote in 2020 is positive and statistically significant with a p value of
less than 0.001. This indicates that there is a greater probability of voting in 2020 for Latinos of
higher income and for Latinos who have completed more education, all else equal.
The relationship between conservative self-identification and turning out to vote in 2020
among Latinos is negative, although this finding is not statistically significant. Likewise, the
relationship between stronger Republican self-identification among Latinos and the probability
of turning out to vote in 2020 is negative but not statistically significant. The relationship
between marriage and voting in 2020 is also negative and not statistically significant. While the
relationship between identifying as Latina and voting in 2020 is positive, this finding is also not
statistically significant. Latino parenthood finds a negative relationship with turning out to vote
in 2020, although this finding is not statistically significant as well. When the model is limited to
Latinos, the constant is positive and not statistically significant.
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The high Wald chi2 statistic of 159.91 and the low corresponding p value of less than
0.001 indicates that the model limited to respondents who politically identify as independent is a
good fit. This is supported by the pseudo R2 of 0.1613, although it is not directly interpretable.
Among independents, the four oldest age categories are positive and statistically significant.
Independents in the 45- to 54-year-old cohort find a .9501 increased probability of voting in the
2020 election, all else equal, with a p value of less than 0.01 for statistical significance.
Independents who fall into the 55 to 64 cohort have a .9518 increase in the probability of voting
in the 2020 election, all else equal, with a p value of less than 0.01 for statistical significance.
Those in the next age category, 65- to 74-year-olds, have a .9716 increase in the probability of
voting in 2020, all else equal, with a p value of less than 0.01 for statistically significance. The
75-and-over age group have a .9899 increase in the probability of voting in 2020, all else equal,
with a p value of less than 0.001 for statistical significance. This finding fails to find support for
hypothesis one, as it argued that there would be a decrease in voter turnout among older voters of
different identities.
There is a decreased probability of voting in 2020 for Black independents, which is
statistically significant with a p value of less than 0.05. While the relationship between voter
turnout and Latino identity among independents is also negative, this finding fails to reach
statistical significance. The relationship between poorer self-reported health and voter turnout in
2020 is also negative among independents, although this finding also fails to reach statistical
significance.
Among independents, the relationship between higher family income and the probability
of voting in 2020 is positive and statistically significant with a p value of less than 0.001, which
indicates that wealthier independents were more likely to have voted in 2020 than their poorer
34

counterparts. Likewise, independents who report higher levels of education have a higher
probability of voting in the 2020 election, with a relationship that is positive and statistically
significant with a p value of less than 0.001.
The relationship between ideology and voter turnout is negative for political
independents who identify as more ideologically conservative, although this finding is not
statistically significant. Married independents also see a decrease in voter turnout that is not
statistically significant.
Independent women have a decreased probability of voting in 2020, a finding which is
statistically significant with a p value of less than 0.01. Although this finding is not statistically
significant, independents with children also have a decreased probability of voter turnout in
2020. In the independent-only model, the constant is positive and not statistically significant.
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Table 10: Hypothesis One, Political Disaggregation
Variable
Age

b (se)

Model 7: Democrats
z
margins

b (se)

Model 8: Republicans
z
margins

25-34
35-44
45-54
55-64
65-74
75+

.324 (.284)
.844 (.292)**
1.31 (.358)***
1.187 (.335)***
2.344 (.391)***
2.395 (.27)***

1.14
2.89
3.66
3.55
6.00
5.10

.9595
.9755
.9845
.9825
.9944
.9947

.192 (.339)
1.104 (.337)**
1.519 (.348)***
1.795 (.343)***
2.445 (.379)***
2.384 (.483)***

0.57
3.28
4.36
5.24
6.45
4.94

.9268
.9693
.9795
.9844
.9918
.9913

Black
Latino

-.058 (.211)
-.428 (.207)*
-.1 (.068)
.164 (.03)***
.3 (.06)***
-.287 (.051)***
.3 (.171)
-.197 (.172)
-.356 (.208)
1.835 (.37)***

-0.27
-2.07
-1.47
5.45
5.00
-5.61
1.76
-1.14
-1.71
4.97

.9816
.9731

-.341 (.325)
-.364 (.272)
-.274 (.087)**
.108 (.029)***
.221 (.056)***
.371 (.059)***
.401 (.164)*
.004 (.154)
-.334 (.187)
-.625 (.571)

-1.05
-1.34
-3.15
3.72
3.93
6.33
2.44
0.03
-1.78
-1.10

.9733
.9729

Race

Health
Income
Education
Ideology
Marital status
Gender
Children
Constant

.9841
.9799
.9782
.9815

n
17,829
Wald chi2
244.71
Prob > chi2
0.0000
Pseudo R2
0.1594
*p < 0.05 **p < 0.01 ***p < 0.001
Source: Congressional Election Study 2020
Post-election weight variable applied

.9833
.9807
.9789
.9807

12,143
288.53
0.0000
0.1633

The high Wald chi2 statistic of 244.71 and low corresponding p value of less than 0.001
indicate that the Democrat-only model is a good fit. This is supported by the pseudo R2 of
0.1594, although it is not directly interpretable. Among Democrats, the oldest five age categories
have a positive and statistically significant relationship with voting in the 2020 election.
Democrats who are between 35 and 44 years of age have a .9755 increase in the probability of
voting, all else equal. This is statistically significant with a p value of less than 0.01. Democrats
between 45 and 54 years old have a .9845 increase in the probability of voting in 2020, all else
equal, which is statistically significant with a p value of less than 0.001. Democrats in the next
age category, those 55 to 64, have a .9825 increase in the probability of voting in 2020, all else
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equal, with a p value of less than 0.001 for statistical significance. Democrats who are between
65 and 74 years of age have a .9944 increase in the probability of voting in 2020, all else equal,
with a p value of less than 0.001 for statistical significance. Finally, Democrats who are 75 and
above have an .9947 increase in the probability of voting in 2020, all else equal, with a p value of
less than 0.001 for statistical significance. These findings fail to find support for the first
hypothesis, which argues that older voters will have a decreased probability of voting when
taking other identities into account.
Although it is not statistically significant, the relationship between Black Democrats and
voter turnout is negative. Democratic Latinos have a .9731 decrease in the probability of voting
in 2020, all else equal, which is statistically significant with a p value of less than 0.05.
The relationship between poorer health and voter turnout is negative for Democrats,
although this finding is not statistically significant. Democrats who have higher incomes see an
increase in the probability of voting in 2020, all else equal, with a p value of less than 0.001 for
statistical significance. Likewise, better-educated Democrats have an increase in the probability
of voting in 2020, all else equal, with a p value of less than 0.001 for statistical significance.
There is a negative relationship between Democrats who identify as more conservative
and voting in 2020. This finding is statistically significant with a p value of less than 0.001. The
relationship between married Democrats and voting in 2020 is positive but not statistically
significant, while Democratic women and Democrats with children have a negative and not
statistically significant relationship with voting in 2020. In the Democrat-only model, the
constant is positive and statistically significant with a p value of less than 0.001.
At 288.53, the Wald chi2 statistic is high in the Republican-only model. This finding,
along with a low p value of less than 0.001 and a pseudo R2 of 0.1633, indicates a good fit for the
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Republican-only model. As with the Democrat-only model, the five oldest age categories are
positive and statistically significant in the Republican-only model, which indicates an increase in
the probability of voting in 2020 for Republicans as they age. Republicans between the ages of
35 and 44 have a .9693 increase in the probability of voting in 2020, all else equal, with a p value
of less than 0.01 for statistical significance. Republicans between the ages of 45 and 54 have a
.9795 increase in the probability of voting in 2020, all else equal, with a p value of less than
0.001 for statistical significance. Republicans between the ages of 55 and 64 have a .9854
increase in the probability of voting in 2020, all else equal, with a p value of less than 0.001 for
statistical significance. Republicans between the ages of 65 and 74 have a .9918 increase in the
probability of voting in 2020, all else equal, with a p value of less than 0.001 for statistical
significance. Finally, Republicans who are 75 years of age and older have a .9913 increase in the
probability of voting in 2020, all else equal, with a p value of less than 0.001 for statistical
significance. This positive and statistically significant relationship between age and voting in
2020 among Republicans fails to find support for the first hypothesis, which argued that older
individuals would see a decrease in voter turnout when accounting for other factors.
The relationships between voter turnout and either Black or Latino self-identification for
Republicans is negative and not statistically significant. However, unlike in the Democrat-only
model, a poorer self-assessment of health has a negative and statistically significant relationship
with voter turnout. Republicans who view their health poorly have a decreased probability of
voting in 2020, all else equal, with a p value of less than 0.01 for statistical significance.
Republicans who report a higher level of family income have an increased probability of
voting in 2020, which is statistically significant with a p value of less than 0.001. Likewise,
better-educated Republicans have an increased probability of voting in 2020, all else equal, with
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a p value of 0.001 for statistical significance. In other words, Republicans who have higher
incomes and/or who have reached higher levels of education have an increased probability of
voting in 2020.
Republicans who identify as increasingly conservative have an increased probability of
voting in 2020, all else equal, with a p value of less than 0.001 for statistical significance.
Married Republicans have a .9833 increased probability of voting in 2020, all else equal, with a
p value of less than 0.05 for statistical significance. Although not statistically significant, the
relationship between Republican women and voting in 2020 is positive. In contrast, although it is
also not statistically significant, there is a negative relationship between Republicans who have
children and voter turnout in 2020. In the Republican-only model, the constant is negative and
not statistically significant.
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Table 11: Hypothesis One, Educational Disaggregation
Model 9: With Degrees
b (se)
z
margins

Variable
Age

Model 10: Without Degrees
b (se)
z
margins

25-34
35-44
45-54
55-64
65-74
75+

-.03 (.366)
.614 (.382)
1.305 (.407)**
1.406 (.392)***
2.491 (.45)***
1.884 (.536)***

-0.08
1.60
3.21
3.59
5.54
3.52

.9567
.9768
.9883
.9894
.9964
.9934

.249 (.218)
.894 (.227)***
1.326 (.254)***
1.384 (.248)***
2.216 (.278)***
2.647 (.368)***

1.14
3.93
5.22
5.59
7.98
7.19

.882
.9344
.9564
.9588
.9816
.988

Black
Latino

-.804 (.255)**
-.281 (.247)
-.147 (.075)*
.124 (.026)***
.046 (.07)
-.15 (.06)*
.142 (.174)
.116 (.153)
-.425 (.176)*
3.09 (.429)***

-3.15
-1.14
-1.97
4.71
0.65
-2.49
0.81
0.76
-2.42
7.20

.9712
.9816

-.239 (.17)
-.582 (.186)**
-.165 (.058)**
.184 (.024)***
-.067 (.048)
-.025 (.04)
.316 (.036)*
-.215 (.123)
-.392 (.157)*
1.923 (.29)***

-1.14
-3.12
-2.86
7.75
-1.38
-0.62
2.33
-1.75
-2.49
6.64

.9458
.927

Race

Health
Income
Ideology
Party identification
Marital status
Gender
Children
Constant

.9866
.9865
.9831
.9858

n
18,498
Wald chi2
197.32
Prob > chi2
0.0000
Pseudo R2
0.0879
*p < 0.05 **p < 0.01 ***p < 0.001
Source: Congressional Election Study 2020
Post-election weight variable applied

.9616
.9508
.9493
.9555

15,262
280.11
0.0000
0.1170

With a Wald chi2 statistic of 197.32 and a low corresponding p value of less than 0.001,
the model that is limited to those who have achieved at least a 2-year degree is a good fit. The
pseudo R2 of 0.0879, while not directly interpretable, supports this finding. In the collegeeducated model, the relationship between voter turnout and the four oldest age groups is positive
and statistically significant. For college graduates between the ages of 45 and 54, there is a .9883
increase in the likelihood of voter turnout, all else equal, which is statistically significant with a p
value of less than 0.01. College graduates between the ages of 55 and 64 have a .9894 increase in
the probability of voting in 2020, all else equal, with a p value of less than 0.001 for statistical
significance. College graduates between the ages of 65 and 74 have a .9964 increase in the
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probability of voting in 2020, all else equal, with a p value of less than 0.001 for statistical
significance. Finally, college graduates who are 75 years of age and older have a .9934 increase
in the probability of voting in 2020, all else equal, with a p value of less than 0.001 for statistical
significance. Overall, the positive and statistically significant relationship between age and voter
turnout in 2020 fails to find support for hypothesis one, which argued that older individuals
would see a decrease in voter turnout when taking other factors into account.
There is a negative and statistically significant relationship between Black college
graduates and voter turnout, in which Black graduates have a .9712 decreased probability of
voting in the 2020 election. This finding is statistically significant with a p value of less than
0.01. Latinos who have college degrees also have a decreased probability of voting in the 2020
election, but this finding is not statistically significant. College graduates who report poorer
health outcomes also have a negative and statistically significant relationship with voter turnout,
in which graduates who report experiencing poor health have a decreased probability of voting in
2020, all else equal, with a p value of less than 0.05 for statistical significance.
For college graduates, those with higher income have an increased probability of voting
in the 2020 election, all else equal, with a p value of less than 0.001 for statistical significance.
Although there is a positive relationship between graduates who identify as politically
conservative and voter turnout in 2020, this finding is not statistically significant. There is a
negative relationship between graduates who more strongly identify as Republican and voter
turnout in 2020, which indicates that Republican graduates have an increased probability of
voting, all else equal, with a p value of less than 0.05 for statistical significance.
For college graduates, the relationship between marriage and voter turnout is positive
albeit not statistically significant. The relationship between college graduates who identify as
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women and voting in 2020 is also positive but not statistically significant. There is a negative
and statistically significant relationship between parenthood and voter turnout for college
graduates, in which graduates with children have a .9831 decreased probability of voting in
2020, all else equal, with a p value of less than 0.05. For the college educated model, the
constant is positive and statistically significant with a p value of less than 0.001.
With a high Wald chi2 of 280.11 and a low corresponding p value of less than 0.001, the
model that is limited to only those who have less than a 2-year degree is a good fit. The pseudo
R2, while not directly interpretable, supports this finding. The relationship between advancing
age and voter turnout in 2020 among people without university degrees is largely positive and
statistically significant. For those without a college degree who are between 35 and 44, there is a
.9344 increase in the probability of voter turnout, all else equal, with a p value of less than 0.001
for statistical significance. For individuals without a college degree who are in the 45 to 54 age
cohort, there is a .9564 increase in the probability of voting in 2020, all else equal, with a p value
of less than 0.001 for statistical significance. Those without degrees in the next age group, who
are between 55 and 64, have a .9588 increase in the probability of voting in the 2020 election, all
else equal, with a p value of less than 0.001 for statistical significance. There is a .9816 increase
in the probability of those without a college degree between the ages of 65 and 74 voting in the
2020 election, all else equal, with a p value of less than 0.001 for statistical significance.
Individuals who have not earned a college degree in the 75 and over age category have a .988
increase in the probability of voting in the 2020 election, all else equal, with a p value of less
than 0.001 for statistical significance. This model fails to find support for hypothesis one, as it
argued that older people would have a decreased probability of voting in 2020 when taking other
demographic factors, such as level of education, into account.
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The relationship between Black individuals who have not earned a college degree and
voter turnout in 2020 is negative but not statistically significant. Latinos without college degrees
have a .927 decreased probability of voting in 2020, all things equal, with a p value of less than
0.01 for statistical significance. Individuals who have poorer self-reported health statuses have a
negative and statistically significant relationship with voter turnout in 2020, which indicates that
for those without degrees who also report poor health have a decreased probability of voting in
2020, all else equal, with a p value of less than 0.01 for statistical significance.
There is an increased probability of voting in 2020 for individuals who do not have
degrees and report a high family income compared to those with lower incomes. This finding has
a p value of 0.001 for statistical significance. Although the relationship between conservative
self-identification among those without college degrees and voter turnout in 2020 is negative,
this finding is not statistically significant. Likewise, the relationship between those without
college degrees who identify more strongly as Republicans and voter turnout in 2020 is also
negative and not statistically significant.
Married individuals without college degrees have a .9616 increase in the probability of
voting in the 2020 election, all else equal, with a p value of less than 0.05 for statistical
significance. There is a negative relationship between women who do not have a college degree
and voter turnout in 2020, although this finding is not statistically significant. There is a .9493
decrease in the probability of voting in the 2020 election for parents who do not have a college
degree, which is statistically significant with a p value of 0.05. The constant for the model
limited to those without a college degree is positive and statistically significant with a p value of
less than 0.001.
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Table 12: Hypothesis One, Gender Disaggregation
Variable
Age

b (se)

Model 11: Women
z
margins

b (se)

Model 12: Men
z

margins

25-34
35-44
45-54
55-64
65-74
75+

.065 (.225)
.795 (.24)**
1.292 (.261)***
1.266 (.268)***
2.388 (.291)***
2.717 (.333)***

0.29
3.32
4.95
4.73
8.21
8.17

.9257
.9628
.977
.9764
.9922
.9944

.287 (.304)
.836 (.298)**
1.405 (.351)***
1.59 (.322)***
2.147 (.405)***
2.236 (.542)***

0.94
2.80
4.00
4.94
5.31
4.12

.9378
.9631
.9788
.9823
.9898
.9906

Black
Latino

-.326 (.173)
-.36 (.171)*
-.19 (.05)***
.175 (.02)***
.339 (.045)***
-.036 (.044)
-.031 (.039)
.27 (.115)*
-.464 (.152)**
1.071 (.32)**

-1.89
-2.11
-3.80
8.93
7.48
-0.81
-0.78
2.34
-3.05
3.35

.9675
.966

-.411 (.363)
-.648 (.266)*
-.118 (.087)
.114 (.03)***
.263 (.056)***
-.028 (.077)
-.077 (.064)
.235 (.212)
-.194 (.226)
1.468 (.438)**

-1.63
-2.44
-1.36
3.86
4.67
-0.37
-1.19
1.11
-0.86
3.35

.9653
.9567

Race

Health
Income
Education
Ideology
Party identification
Marital status
Children
Constant

.9782
.9712
.9753

n
18,573
Wald chi2
480.71
Prob > chi2
0.0000
Pseudo R2
0.1614
*p < 0.05 **p < 0.01 ***p < 0.001
Source: Congressional Election Study 2020
Post-election weight variable applied

.978
.9737
.9757

15,187
166.74
0.0000
0.1178

The high Wald chi2 statistic of 480.71 and the low corresponding p value of less than
0.001 indicate that the model limited to only women respondents is a good fit. The pseudo R2 of
0.1614, while not directly interpretable, supports this finding. The overall relationship between
age, women, and voting in the 2020 election is positive and statistically significant. For women
between the ages of 35 and 44, there is a .9628 increase in the probability of voting in 2020, all
else equal, with a p value of less than 0.01 for statistical significance. Women between the ages
of 45 and 54 have a .977 increase in the probability of voting in 2020, all else equal, with a p
value of less than 0.001 for statistical significance. Women between the ages of 55 and 64 have a
.9764 increase in the probability of voter turnout in 2020, all else equal, which is statistically
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significant with a p value of less than 0.001. Women in the 65- to 74-year-old age cohort have a
.9922 increase in the probability of voting in 2020, all else equal, with a p value of less than
0.001 for statistical significance. Women who are 75 years of age and older have a .9944
increase in the probability of voting in 2020, all else equal, with a p value of less than 0.001 for
statistical significance. The positive and significant relationship between age and voter turnout
for women fails to find support for hypothesis one, as it argued that older age groups would see a
decrease in the probability of voter turnout when accounting for other demographic factors.
Black women have a negative albeit not statistically significant relationship with voter
turnout in 2020, while Latinas have a .966 decreased probability of voting in 2020 with a p value
of less than 0.05 for statistical significance. Women who report experiencing poorer health have
a negative and statistically significant relationship with voting in 2020, in which women of
poorer health have a decreased probability of voting, all else equal, with a p value of less than
0.001 for statistical significance.
Women who report higher family income have an increased probability of voting in 2020
with a p value of less than 0.001 for statistical significance. Likewise, women who report having
completed more education have an increased probability in voting in the 2020 election, all else
equal, with a p value of less than 0.001 for statistical significance. The relationship between
women who identify as more conservative and voter turnout is negative but not statistically
significant. Likewise, the relationship between women who identify as more strongly Republican
and voter turnout is negative and not statistically significant.
Married women have a .9782 increase in the probability of voting in 2020, all else equal,
with a p value of less than 0.05 for statistical significance. However, women with children have a
.9712 decrease in the probability of voting in 2020, all else equal, with a p value of less than 0.01
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for statistical significance. The constant in the women-only model is positive and statistically
significant with a p value of less than 0.01.
The high Wald chi2 statistic of 166.74 and the low corresponding p value of less than
0.001 indicates a good fit for the men-only model. The pseudo R2, while not directly
interpretable, supports this finding. The relationship between men, aging, and voter turnout is
positive and largely statistically significant. For men in the 35 to 44 age cohort, there is a .9631
increase in the probability of voting in 2020, all else equal, with a p value of less than 0.01 for
statistical significance. Men who are between 45 and 54 years of age have a .9788 increase in the
probability of voting in 2020, all else equal, with a p value of less than 0.001 for statistical
significance. Men between the ages of 55 and 64 have a .9823 increase in the probability of
voting in 2020, all else equal, with a p value of less than 0.001 for statistical significance. Men in
the subsequent age category, who are between 65 and 74 years of age, have a .9898 increase in
the probability of voting in the 2020 election, all else equal, with a p value of less than 0.001 for
statistical significance. Men who are 75 years of age or older have a .9906 increase in the
probability of voting in the 2020 election, all else equal, with a p value of less than 0.001 for
statistical significance. This positive and significant relationship between age and voter turnout
among men fails to find support for hypothesis one, as it argued that there would be a decrease in
voter turnout when accounting for various demographic variables.
There is a negative relationship between identifying as a Black man and voting in the
2020 general election, although this finding is not statistically significant. For men who identify
as Latino, there is a .9567 decrease in the probability of voting in 2020, all else equal, with a p
value of less than 0.05 for statistical significance. Although the relationship between voter
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turnout and men who report poorer health experiences is negative, as it is in the women-only
model, this finding is not statistically significant.
The relationship between voter turnout and men who report higher family incomes is
positive and statistically significant. Wealthier men have an increased probability of voting in
2020, all else equal, with a p value of less than 0.001 for statistical significance. Likewise, bettereducated men have an increased probability of voting in the 2020 election, all else equal, with a
p value of less than 0.001 for statistical significance.
As with the women-only model, the relationship between conservative self-identification
and voter turnout among men is negative but not statistically significant. Likewise, the
relationship between men who identify more strongly as Republican and voter turnout in 2020 is
negative but not statistically significant. While the relationship between marriage and voter
turnout is positive for men, this finding is not statistically significant. The negative relationship
between fatherhood and voter turnout is negative albeit not statistically significant. The constant
in the men-only model is positive and statistically significant with a p value of less than 0.01.
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Table 13: Hypothesis One, Marital Disaggregation
Variable
Age

b (se)

Model 13: Married
z
margins

b (se)

Model 14: Not Married
z
margins

25-34
35-44
45-54
55-64
65-74
75+

.647 (.366)
1.301 (.384)**
1.838 (.388)***
1.972 (.382)***
2.889 (.435)***
2.605 (.543)***

1.77
3.39
4.74
5.16
6.64
4.80

.951
.9739
.9846
.9865
.9946
.9928

.110 (.216)
.728 (.223)**
1.231 (.264)***
1.271 (.261)***
2.149 (.296)***
2.781 (.336)***

0.51
3.27
4.66
4.88
7.27
8.28

.9049
.9464
.9669
.9681
.9865
.9928

Black
Latino

-.558 (.232)*
-.632 (.216)**
.01 (.074)
.204 (.024)***
.239 (.048)***
.112 (.061)
-.107 (.051)*
-.026 (.139)
-.278 (.185)
.03 (.508)

-2.40
-2.92
0.13
8.35
4.94
1.84
-2.07
-0.19
-1.50
0.06

.9752
.9735

-.323 (.175)
-.345 (.22)
-.237 (.06)***
.099 (.024)***
.356 (05)***
-.116 (.049)**
-.018 (.042)
-.176 (.135)
.404 (.163)*
1.867 (.327)***

-1.84
-1.57
-3.93
4.20
7.13
-2.36
-0.43
-1.30
-2.48
5.71

.9473
.9449

Race

Health
Income
Education
Ideology
Party identification
Gender
Children
Constant

.9848
.9841
.985

n
19,781
Wald chi2
292.56
Prob > chi2
0.0000
Pseudo R2
0.1554
*p < 0.05 **p < 0.01 ***p < 0.001
Source: Congressional Election Study 2020
Post-election weight variable applied

.956
.9489
.9592

13,979
252.98
0.0000
0.1157

With a high Wald chi2 of 292.56 and a low corresponding p value of less than 0.001, the
model which focuses on married individuals is a good fit. The pseudo R2 of 0.1554, while not
directly interpretable, concurs with this finding. The relationship between marriage, aging, and
voter turnout in 2020 is largely positive and statistically significant. For married individuals
between the ages of 35 and 44, there is a .9739 increase in the probability of voting in 2020, all
things equal, with a p value of less than 0.01 for statistical significance. For married individuals
between the ages of 45 and 54, there is a .9846 increase in the probability of voting in 2020, all
things equal, with a p value of less than 0.001 for statistical significance. For those between the
ages of 55 and 64 who are married, there is a .9865 increase in the probability of voting in 2020,
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all things equal, with a p value of less than 0.001 for statistical significance. Among 65- to 74year-olds who are married, there is a .9946 increase in the probability of voting in 2020, all
things equal, with a p value of less than 0.001 for statistical significance. In the oldest age cohort,
those who are 75 and above, there is a .9928 increase in the probability of voting in 2020, all
things equal, with a p value of less than 0.001 for statistical significance. This positive and
statistically significant relationship between age and voter turnout for married individuals fails to
find support for hypothesis one, as it argued that older individuals would see a decrease in voter
turnout when accounting for other factors.
For married individuals who identify as Black, there is a .9752 decrease in the probability
of voting in 2020, all things equal, with a p value of less than 0.05 for statistical significance.
Likewise, for married individuals who identify as Latino, there is a .9735 decrease in the
probability of voting in 2020, all things equal, with a p value of less than 0.01 for statistical
significance. Although the relationship between married individuals who report experiencing
poorer health and voter turnout is positive, this finding is not statistically significant.
Married individuals who report higher levels of family income have an increased
probability of voting in 2020, all things equal, with a p value of less than 0.001. Similarly,
married individuals with more formal education have an increased probability of voting in 2020,
all things equal, with a p value of less than 0.001 for statistical significance. Married individuals
who identify more conservatively have a positive relationship with voter turnout, although this
finding is not statistically significant. Married individuals who identify more strongly as
Republicans have a negative and statistically significant relationship with voter turnout,
indicating that married Republicans have an increased probability of voting in 2020, all things
equal, with a p value of less than 0.05 for statistical significance.
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There is a negative albeit not statistically significant relationship between married women
and voter turnout. The relationship between married people with children and voter turnout is
likewise negative and not statistically significant. In the married-only model, the constant is
positive and not statistically significant.
The model which captures the probability of voter turnout for individuals who are single,
widowed, divorced, or separated has a high Wald chi2 of 252.98 and a low corresponding p value
of less than 0.001. This indicates that the model is a good fit. The pseudo R2 of 0.1157 supports
this finding, although it is not directly interpretable.
The relationship between age and voter turnout for unmarried individuals is largely
positive and statistically significant. For unmarried individuals between the ages of 35 to 44,
there is a .9464 increase in the probability of voting in 2020, all things equal, with a p value of
less than 0.01 for statistical significance. For unmarried individuals in the next age cohort of 45
to 54, there is a .9669 increase in the probability of voting in 2020, all things equal, with a p
value of less than 0.001 for statistical significance. Unmarried individuals between 55 and 64
have a .9681 increase in the probability of voter turnout, all things equal, with a p value of less
than 0.001 for statistical significance. Unmarried individuals between 65 and 74 years of age
have a .9865 increase in the probability of voting in 2020, all things equal, with a p value of less
than 0.001 for statistical significance. The oldest age cohort, those who are 75 and above, have a
.9928 increase in the probability of voting in 2020, all things equal, with a p value of less than
0.001. This finding fails to find support for hypothesis one, which argued that older individuals
would experience a decrease in voter turnout when accounting for other demographic factors.
The relationship between voter turnout and identifying as Black is negative but not
statistically significant for the unmarried cohort. Similarly, the relationship between voter
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turnout and identifying as Latino is negative but not statistically significant for the unmarried
cohort. The relationship between reporting poorer health experiences in the unmarried cohort and
voter turnout is negative and statistically significant; unmarried individuals who report
experiencing poorer health have a decreased probability of voting in the 2020 election, all things
equal, with a p value of less than 0.001 for statistical significance.
The relationship between higher reported family income and voter turnout among
unmarried individuals is positive and statistically significant, indicating that wealthier unmarried
individuals have an increase in the probability of voting in 2020, all else equal, with a p value of
less than 0.001 for statistical significance. Similarly, better-educated unmarried individuals see
an increase in the probability of voter turnout in 2020, all else equal, with a p value of less than
0.001 for statistical significance.
There is a negative and statistically significant relationship between voter turnout and
increasing conservative self-identification for the unmarried cohort. More conservative and
unmarried individuals have a decreased probability of voting in the 2020 election, all things
equal, with a p value of less than 0.01 for statistical significance. The relationship between voter
turnout and stronger Republican self-identification is also negative, although this finding is not
statistically significant.
The relationship between unmarried women and voter turnout is negative and not
statistically significant. Unmarried parents have a .9489 decreased probability of voting in 2020,
all things equal, with a p value of less than 0.05 for statistical significance. The constant in the
unmarried model is positive and statistically significant with a p value of less than 0.001.
Disaggregating the voter turnout model using CES data does not find support for
hypothesis one. Although several identities decrease the probability of an individual voting in
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2020, increasing age is found to maintain a positive and statistically significant relationship with
voter turnout across multiple models.
Hypothesis two delves into the reasons nonvoters claim stopped them from voting in the
2020 election. It does this by conducting a chi2 analysis of the distribution of the different excuse
types by age cohort. The second hypothesis expects that younger nonvoters are more likely to
cite psychological reasons for not voting due to disempowerment, while older individuals are
more likely to report institutional or health-related reasons for not voting because they are less
able to overcome institutional barriers and are more cautious.
Table 14: Hypothesis Two
Variable

18 to
24

25 to
34

35 to
44

45 to
54

55 to
64

65 to
74

Over
75

Total

Psychological

205
38.90

507
37.14

412
33.91

284
34.51

297
28.81

128
25.10

31
21.99

1,864
33.21

Institutional

157
29.79

403
29.52

367
30.21

232
28.19

337
32.69

204
40.00

53
37.59

1,753
31.24

Election day
issues

42
7.97

77
5.64

61
5.02

31
3.77

52
5.04

20
3.92

9
6.38

292
5.20

Health

44
8.35

137
10.04

114
9.38

102
12.39

135
13.09

57
11.18

16
11.35

605
10.78

79
14.99
527
100.00

241
17.66
1,365
100.00

261
21.48
1,215
100.00

174
21.14
823
100.00

210
20.37
1,031
100.00

101
19.80
510
100.00

32
22.70
141
100.00

1,098
19.57
5,612
100.00

Other/don’t
know
Total
Pearson chi2
pr

92.3232
0.000

Source: Congressional Election Study 2020
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According to Table 14, younger voters are more likely to report psychological reasons for
not voting. 38.9% of the 18 to 24 cohort reported psychological issues, 37.14% of the 25 and 34
cohort reported psychological issues, and 33.91% of the 35 and 44 cohort reported psychological
issues. In comparison, 34.51% of nonvoters ages 45 to 54 reported psychological challenges,
28.81% of 55- to 64-year-olds reported psychological reasons for not voting, 25.1% of 65- to 74year-olds cited psychological reasons, and 21.99% of those over 75 reported psychological
barriers to voting. This finds support for hypothesis two, which argues that younger voters were
more likely to report psychological constraints to voting.
The oldest two age cohorts, those ages 65 to 74 and those 75 and above, are
proportionately more likely to report not voting because of institutional challenges they faced.
40% of nonvoters ages 65 to 74 reported institutional barriers while 37.59% of nonvoters ages 75
and over reported institutional barriers. In comparison, only 29.79% of 18- to 24-year-olds
reported institutional barriers, 29.52% of 25- to 34-year-olds, 30.1% of 35- to 44-year-olds,
28.19% of 45- to 54-year-olds, and 32.69% of 55- to 64-year-olds reported institutional barriers
to voting. This finding also indicates support for hypothesis two, which argues that older voters
are more likely to report institutional challenges to voting.
The middle-aged cohorts report health concerns at higher rates than the youngest and
oldest cohorts. Only 8.35% of 18- to 24-year-olds reported health concerns, while 10.04% of 25to 34-year-olds cited health concerns and 9.38% of 35- to 44-year-olds. 11.18% of 65- to 74year-olds reported health concerns, while 11.35% of those 75 and older reported health concerns.
In comparison, 12.39% of 45- to 54-year-olds and 13.09% of 55- to 64-year-olds claimed health
concerns stopped them from voting in 2020. This finding fails to find support for hypothesis two.
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Only 3.92% of the nonvoting 65- to 74-year-old cohort reported issues on election day,
while 7.97% of nonvoters ages 18 to 24 reported election-day issues. 6.38% of nonvoters 75 and
older reported election-day issues, while 5.64% of 25- to 34-year-olds, 5.02% of 35- to 44-yearolds, 3.77% of 45- to 54-year-olds, and 5.04% of 55- to 64-year-olds reported election day
issues. There is no clear pattern to which age cohorts are more likely to cite election-day issues
as to why they did not vote in 2020.
The older cohorts claim to not have voted for other or unknown reasons more than the
younger cohorts. Only 14.99% of those ages 18 to 24 and 17.66% of 25- to 34-year-olds report
other or unknown reasons for not voting, while 21.48% of 35- to 44-year-olds, 21.14% of 45- to
54-year-olds, 20.37% of 55- to 64-year-olds, 19.8% of 65- to 74-year-olds, and 22.7% of 75 and
above reported other or unknown reasons for not voting. This indicates that younger voters are
more aware of why they did not vote.
Overall, the results of Table 14 find support for the second hypothesis. Younger
nonvoters report psychological barriers to voting in higher proportions while older nonvoters
report institutional barriers. A greater percentage of older individuals also report other reasons
for not voting, including not knowing why, than younger voters.
Hypothesis three argues that older and disabled voters, as well as voters of color, are
more likely to report difficulty than younger, healthier, and white voters. This is because voters
marginalized by age, ability, and race are more likely to experience the negative effects of at
least one type of voter restriction, while their non-marginalized counterparts incur fewer costs of
overcoming said challenges.
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Table 15: Hypothesis Three
Variable
Age
25-34
35-44
45-54
55-64
65-74
75+
Race
Black
Latino
Health
Income
Education
Ideology
Party identification
Marital status
Gender
Children
Voting as a choice
Cut1
Cut2
Cut3
Cut4

b (se)

z

.255 (.283)
-.067 (.282)
-.663 (.29)*
-.671 (.277)*
-.754 (.295)**
-.637 (.305)*

0.90
-0.24
-2.28
-2.42
-2.65
-2.09

.216 (.266)
.3 (.23)
.141 (.062)*
.007 (.013)
.058 (.071)
-.16 (.066)*
.064 (.049)
-.193 (.147)
-.073 (.129)
-.036 (.163)
-.017 (.026)

0.81
1.30
2.27
0.52
0.82
-2.44
1.31
-1.31
-0.56
-0.22
-0.66

1.854 (.443)
2.881 (.44)
4.058 (.446)
4.816 (.484)

n
Wald chi2
Prob > chi2
Pseudo R2
*p < 0.05 **p < 0.01 ***p < 0.001
Source: American National Election Studies 2020
Post-election weight variable applied

5,237
83.79
0.0000
0.0290

Table 15 has a high Wald chi2 statistic of 83.79 and a low corresponding p value of less
than 0.001, which indicate the model is a good fit. The pseudo R2, while not directly
interpretable, is low at 0.029, which indicates that the model is not a good fit.
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The relationship between age and reporting difficulty voting is largely negative and
statistically significant. There is a decreased probability that individuals between the ages of 45
and 54 will report difficulty voting, which is statistically significant with a p value of less than
0.05. Individuals between the ages of 55 and 64 also see a decrease in the probability of
reporting difficulty voting, which is statistically significant with a p value of less than 0.05.
Individuals between the ages of 65 and 74 have a decreased probability of reporting difficulty
voting, which is statistically significant with a p value of less than 0.01. Voters 75 and over have
a decreased probability of reporting difficulty voting, which is statistically significant with a p
value of less than 0.05. This finding fails to find support for hypothesis three, which argued that
older individuals would have an increased likelihood of reporting difficulty voting.
The relationship between Black individuals and reporting difficulty voting is positive,
although this finding is not statistically significant. Likewise, the relationship between Latino
individuals and reporting difficulty voting is positive but not statistically significant. This fails to
find support for hypothesis three, as it argued that racial/ethnic minority voters would be more
likely to report difficulty due to targeted voter restriction tactics.
There is a positive and statistically significant relationship between individuals who
report experiencing poor health and those who report difficulty voting. Individuals who
experience poor health have an increased probability of reporting difficulty voting, which is
statistically significant with a p value of less than 0.05. This result finds support for hypothesis
three, which argued that disabled individuals would have an increased probability of reporting
difficulty voting.
The relationship between higher levels of income and reported difficulty voting is
positive but not statistically significant. Likewise, the relationship between higher levels of
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education and reported difficulty voting is positive but not statistically significant. Individuals
who identify as more conservative have a decreased probability of reporting difficulty voting,
which is statistically significant with a p value of less than 0.05. The relationship between
reported difficulty voting and stronger Republican identity is positive, although this finding is
not statistically significant.
Married individuals have a decreased probability of reporting difficulty voting, although
this finding is not statistically significant. Likewise, women have a decreased probability of
reporting difficulty voting, which is also not statistically significant. People with children have a
decreased probability of reporting difficulty voting, which is also not statistically significant.
People who view voting as a choice rather than a duty also have a decreased probability in
reporting difficulty voting, but this finding is not statistically significant.
Overall, the results of these quantitative analyses fail to find support for hypothesis one,
while finding support for hypothesis two and limited support for hypothesis three. There are
limitations to the data used which may interfere with the results found in this thesis. For
example, although the CES 2020 sample includes over 61,000 individuals, white respondents
vastly outweigh respondents of other races and ethnicities. Future research that draws from more
diverse datasets or employs different models may find more support for the three hypotheses
tested in this thesis.
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CHAPTER SIX: CONCLUSION
Voting is an essential feature of democracy because it allows constituents to express their
opinions and leverage their political power. An individual who does not vote fails to have their
voice heard by their representatives in a democratic government. Historically, certain
communities were disenfranchised to consolidate the power of other, more powerful groups.
Even with protective legislation such as the 1965 Voting Rights Act, many of these same
communities are marginalized today.
Some Republican legislators have targeted voting rights in several key states following
historic voter turnout during the 2020 American presidential election. They cite non-existent
voter fraud and election insecurity to justify passing these measures. It is well-documented that
communities of color and low-income communities are those most affected by voter restriction
measures. Although there is less focus on the disabled community, they, too, suffer under
restrictive legislation.
Traditional research has found that older voters turn out in higher rates than younger
voters. Using an intersectional framework, this thesis argues that voters over the age of 65 in the
United States will be less likely to turn out to vote than their younger counterparts when
considering other identities. Although not directly targeted by longer wait times, strict
identification requirements, voter roll purges, and other tactics, elderly voters are still negatively
affected by these measures. With the elderly population growing at an exponential rate in the
United States, as Americans live longer and the last of the Baby Boomers become eligible for
Medicare, this diverse community’s right to vote is of paramount importance.
Combining a rational-choice and intersectional framework, three hypotheses were
developed to investigate the relationship between age, race, ability, and electoral experiences.
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The first hypothesis, which argued that older voters would experience a decrease in voter
turnout, failed to find support. An increase in age increases an individual’s probability of voting
in 2020, according to data from both the American National Election Studies and the
Cooperative Election Study. This finding was consistent among models disaggregated for race,
party identification, education, gender, and marital status. This indicates that age is a powerful
and positive predictor of voter turnout among a diverse sample of American voters.
The second hypothesis, which argued that older individuals would be more likely to
report institutional barriers to voting while younger individuals would be more likely to report
psychological barriers to voting, found support. A greater percentage of younger voters report
not voting due to psychological reasons, while a greater percentage of older voters report not
voting due to institutional barriers. This diversity of opinion indicates that nonvoters of different
ages face different challenges when deciding when and how to vote. By identifying the specific
challenges that different age groups face, organizers and policymakers can help reduce the
limiting effect of these challenges in the future. Hypothesis two is a potentially fruitful area for
further study, especially in more complex models that account for differences in identities such
as race and party identification.
The third hypothesis argued that older, disabled, and minority voters would be more
likely to report difficulties voting than their younger, able-bodied, and white counterparts.
Limited support was found for hypothesis three, as individuals who report experiencing poorer
health outcomes have an increase in the probability of reporting difficulty voting. However, there
was a decrease in the probability of older voters reporting difficulty. While the relationship
between reporting difficulty is positive for both Black and Latino voters, it failed to find
statistical significance to support hypothesis three. This indicates that disability is a powerful
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predictor of reported difficulty voting, which can help focus the efforts of organizers and
policymakers who are dedicated to increasing election equity and accessibility.
Failing to find support for hypothesis one does not dilute the importance of studying the
political participation of elderly voters. As more states introduce restrictive tactics and the
federal government fails to ensure voter protections, the behavior of elderly voters remains
noteworthy. Understanding the relationship between age, race, and voter turnout when
accounting for other identities enables researchers, organizers, and policymakers to ensure that
this growing population is given the attention it deserves. Protecting the rights of today’s senior
citizens will help to ensure the democratic future of tomorrow.
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